This paper provides a mean-field game theoretic model of the bandwagon effect 1 in social networks. This effect can be observed whenever individuals tend to align their own 2 opinions to a mainstream opinion. The contribution is threefold. First, we describe the opinion 3 propagation as a mean-field game with local interactions. Second, we establish mean-field 4 equilibrium strategies in the case where the mainstream opinion is constant. Such strategies 5 are shown to have a threshold structure. Third, we extend the use of threshold strategies to the 6 case of time-varying mainstream opinion and study the evolution of the macroscopic system. 7
x ′ (s) = u(s), s ∈ [t, T ], x(t) = x 0 .
(1) The objective of a player with opinion x is to adjust its opinion based on the (possibly per-170 ceived) mainstream opinion m [x](s) . In other words, a player feels more and more rewarded 171 when its and the mainstream opinion get closer and closer. Then, we assume that the players 172 consider a running cost g : R 3 → [0, +∞), (x, m, u) → g(x, m, u) of the form:
g (x, m, u 
the running cost g(·) given by (2-3) penalizes the square deviation of the player's opinion 178 from the mainstream opinion and involves also a penalty term on the energy of control (a 179 quick change of opinion has a greater cost than a slow change) and a fixed cost on control. 180 The latter term captures the level of stubbornness of the players, in which a greater fixed cost 181 increases the inertia of the players, namely the tendency to maintain their original opinion 182 in spite of the different inputs received from everybody else with a different opinion in the 183 population.
184
At the end of the horizon, every player pays a quantity that equals the square deviation of 185 its opinion from the mainstream. This is modeled by a terminal penalty :
188
where S is scalar and positive.
189
The problem in its generic form is the following:
190 Problem 1 Given a finite horizon T > 0, an initial distribution of opinions m 0 , a running 191 cost g as in (2), a final cost as in (4), and given the dynamics for x(·) as in (1) For a further clarification of the language used in the sequel of the paper, hereinafter, we 216 give the following definition. 
229
-In contrast, we call idle all the policies that do not match the above criterion, i.e., policies 230 that admit a switch from a null to a nonnull control.
231
-a control u a is dominated by u b , for a given pair ( (and so its mode too). Specifically, we say that the couple (u, m 0 ) defines an equilibrium. 238 We stress that the above definition delimits the scope of this work. Specifically, it indicates 239 the particular kind of equilibrium that we consider. This kind of equilibrium requires that the 240 population distribution remains constant over time. As we pointed out in the introduction, 241 more general equilibria may possibly exist that just require that no player can benefit from a 242 unilateral deviation from its current behavior.
3 Constant Mainstream and Global Interaction

244
In this section, we assume that the mainstream opinion is constant all over the horizon 245 window. This allows us to introduce the notion of threshold strategy which will play a role 246 throughout the paper. This situation is of particular interest for two reasons. On the one 247 hand, it allows to identify the structure of an equilibrium policy. Indeed, in equilibrium the 248 population distribution m(., .) remains constant over time by definition and then also the 249 mainstream opinion perceived by the agents. On the other hand, in the second part of this 250 work, we will study the consequences of applying such threshold strategies to a more general 251 setting, where the perceived mainstream is possibly time-varying.
252
Assuming a time-invariant mainstream implies the equality m(·) = m, where m is con-253 stant. We are then interested in determining the solution of the following auxiliary problem.
254
Problem 2 Considering a dynamics for x as in (1), minimize over U the following cost There are control policies that can immediately be labeled as nonoptimal as they are trivially 263 dominated. These policies include any control u a nonnull in a measurable interval
Actually, such 265 a control would induce a fixed cost K δ(u a ) in addition to an increased cost derived from 266 pushing the player's state away from the targetm. Control policies that are not trivially 267 dominated are called nontrivially dominated.
268
A second class of policies that do not fit in the set of optimal solutions involves all policies 269 that are idle. Actually, the following lemma proves that a control that is idle is dominated.
270
Lemma 1 Consider a nontrivially dominated control u ∈ U. If u is idle, then u is dominated.
271
Proof This proof is based on a direct comparison of the cost induced by u with the cost of 272 another solution, say u b . If u is idle, then there exist three time instants t 1 , t 1 + t and t 2 ,
We prove that u is dominated by a 275 control u b defined as follows:
.
induced by the two controls are equal for 0 ≤ t ≤ t 1 and t 2 ≤ t ≤ T , as in such intervals the 280 two controls assume the same values and induce the same states for the player.
281
Then considering the interval [t 1 , t 2 ] , the cost paid by u is
Now, by the almost obvious equalities Consider, for eacht ∈ [t, T ], the following cost functional, which is defined as in (6) but 293 only on control strategies with switching timet, namely a control strategy characterized by 294 a nonnull control only up to timet, after which the control is set to zero:
296 Due to the quadratic structure of (7), there always exists a unique optimal solution in U ×[t, T ] 297 for the problemĴ * (x 0 ,t) = min (u,t)∈U×[t,T ] {Ĵ (x 0 , t,t, u(·)) s.t.ẋ = u}.
298
In light of these considerations, and from Lemma 1, we have the following theorem.
299
Theorem 1 (Threshold optimal policy) Given (x 0 , t), there is a unique solution
where the control u * is given by (in a form depending on s and on the actual state x(s)):
t * ] whose structure depends on the initial choice (x 0 , t). Furthermore, given 305 Problem 2, no control in U dominates u * , that is, Problem 2 has an optimal control which is 
314
Proof We determine the unique solution of problemĴ * (x 0 , t) = min (u,t)∈U×[t,T ] {Ĵ (x 0 , t,t, 315 u(·)) s.t.ẋ = u}, whereĴ (·) is defined as in (7), through the application of the maximum 316 principle that leads to the following conditions: where ξ(s) represents the generic player costate.
325
The structure of the optimal control as in (8) sponding control strategy yields controls constantly nonnull over the horizon.
338
Remark 1 Theorem 1 states that the presence of an activation cost attenuates the bandwagon 339 effect and formalizes in which way the attenuation operates:
340
-the control policy (9) indicates that the players who draw their opinion toward the main-341 stream opinion are those whose opinions are away from the mainstream by more than 342 the value indicated by the threshold; differently, the players, whose opinions differ from 343 the mainstream of a value smaller than or equal to that of the threshold, do not pay the 344 activation cost and keep their opinion fixed.
345
-the structure (10) of threshold λ(.) indicates that the smaller the activation cost, the smaller 346 the attenuation of the bandwagon effect. The attenuation disappears when the activation 347 cost is null.
348
In the following section, we will also provide some sufficient condition under which the 349 bandwagon effect disappears due to the presence of a high activation cost. In the previous section, we focused on individually optimal strategies. That is, we proved that 352 equilibrium strategies are threshold ones exploiting the fact that the mainstream opinion m(·) 353 is constant and equal to a given value m. In this section, we focus on the macroscopic system 354 described by the "population distribution." We first present some sufficient conditions that 355 help to identify initial distributions that together with the threshold policy derived in the 356 previous section define an equilibrium. After doing this, we study the problem faced by 357 partially rational players that are not able to determine an optimal strategy. Specifically, we 
363
In the sequel, we make the following assumptions. 
As log(m 0 (x)) is a Lipschitz function, we have 
, with x 0 ≤ x 1 and x n+1 ≥ x n is the 470 minimum interval including the support set of m 0 (x), that is, the neighborhoods of the 471 leaders cover all the possible opinions.
472
We have that m 0 (x) is NCI if log h(·) is sublinear, that is, for any p, q ≥ 0 h( p + q) ≤
583 that is,m is the solution of the transportation equation when the controlû is implemented 584 We are then in the condition to state the following theorem.
585
Theorem 3 For t ≤ s ≤T and for x ≥x, 
589 andm is the solution of (18).
590
Proof We initially observe that solution (19) 
(3) 
